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Such a letter written by a group of Republicans, opponents of the Clinton administration's strategy in the Middle East, was not an occasion for great attention. However, the letter is now seen as prophetic. This is due to the positions many of its signatories moved on to in the administration of George W. Bush, but even more so because of the basic assumptions behind it. The Project calls for a unilateral decision by the United States to abandon the UN-sponsored sanctions against Iraq and instead accept the necessity of military action to remove the Baa'th regime from power. It also repudiates the need for unanimity on the UN Security Council to sanction military action by the United States (Project for a New American Century 2013). Subsequently, George W. Bush's administration accepted and acted on these recommendations, despite widespread protests at home and abroad and strong misgivings among America's closest allies.
One of the results of that decision was the establishment of an informally institutionalized torture regime in the prisons and field interrogation facilities of Afghanistan and Iraq. In my earlier work on this question, I postulated that resistance to the American invasion of Iraq and the need for the United States to show progress in its war against al-Qaeda and its allies had created pressure on the leadership narratives that the Bush administration was using to build support for both its foreign and domestic policy decisions. That pressure led to a need for "actionable intelligence" concerning a clandestine and determined opponent as the wars in Afghanistan and, especially, Iraq intensified. The decision to use "harsh interrogation," initially in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, to obtain intelligence about al-Qaeda and the Iraqi resistance was subsequently given approval by the memoranda issued at different times by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Department of Justice. The result was a stretching of legal and operational boundaries characterized as an accommodating informal institution by Helmke and Levitsky (2004) . In short, a space was created in American law for the use of torture while interrogating prisoners taken by US armed forces or intelligence agencies (Lightcap 2011).
I still believe this causal mechanism is valid, but a basic question still remains: Why was the United States not only willing to abandon its position as the major international opponent of torture, but also to begin the process of informally legalizing the practice? There is ample evidence from quantitative studies that torture is more likely to occur when regimes face substantial threats.
2 Obviously, the attacks of 9/11 were evaluated as such a threat. However, the widespread use of torturous interrogations did not emerge until the threat of new attacks by al-Qaeda on the continental United States had been substantially reduced and both the Taliban and Baa'th regimes had been ousted. Why, then, did torture emerge as a hallmark of the War on Terror? After all, the threats to American ruling elites from al-Qaeda and from the guerrilla forces in Iraq and Afghanistan appear insignificant compared to those faced during World War II or the Cold War. If my earlier analysis is correct, however, the threats faced during the War on Terror must have been evaluated as severe enough to merit abandoning, at considerable strategic cost, long-standing prohibitions against torture.
In this chapter, I am going to propose that one answer to this puzzle is that the emergence of torture in democracies can be dependent on the prior
